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DORIC COLUMNS ARE NOT FALLING: WEDDING CAKES, 
 THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION,  
AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DISTINCTION 
JAMES M. OLESKE, JR.* 
[S]omehow a feeling persists, and is passionately expressed, that 
massive Doric columns are falling. –Charles Black (1967)1 
 
In the space of a few short years, the basic terms of the American 
church-state settlement have gone . . . from being “taken for 
granted” to being “up for grabs.” . . .  The change has been sud-
den, remarkable, and unsettling. –Paul Horwitz (2014)2 
 
It is the evening of religious accommodation. . . .  The govern-
ment’s vindication of third-party dignitary harms has the poten-
tial to destroy religious accommodation. 
–Marc DeGirolami (2015)3 
 
[L]ibertarian skeptics have put themselves in a position to threat-
en even the core applications of public accommodations laws. 
–Samuel Bagenstos (2014)4 
 
[T]he “Freedom of the Church” to ignore the dictates of our var-
ious Civil Rights Acts . . . is a vivid example of a newly emerging 
and deeply troubling family of rights . . . . –Robin West (2015)5 
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Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 89 (1967). 
 2.  Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 155 (2014) (quoting 
Lawrence Lessig, The Puzzling Persistence of Bellbottom Theory: What a Constitutional Theory 
Should Be, 85 GEO. L.J. 1837, 1837 (1997)). 
 3.  Marc. O. DeGirolami, Free Exercise by Moonlight, SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming) 
(manuscript at 3, 32), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2587216. 
 4.  Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accommodations 
Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 1233 (2014). 
 5.  Robin L. West, Freedom of the Church and our Endangered Civil Rights: Exiting the 
Social Contract, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Zoe Robinson et al., eds.) 
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 5), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2595663. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The center is holding.  Our basic understanding of the public-private 
distinction—an understanding that underlies both the church-state and civil-
rights settlements in America—remains intact.  It remains intact despite be-
ing challenged in recent years by a series of novel arguments nurtured in the 
academy and deployed by high-profile political figures.  Some of those ar-
guments would dramatically curtail religious accommodations, even for 
churches.  Others would dramatically expand religious accommodations, 
most notably from civil rights laws in the commercial marketplace.  And 
yet others would deliver a libertarian realignment that would render such 
marketplace accommodations unnecessary.  Any one of those results would 
represent a significant shift in the “Overton Window,”6 which, in the consti-
tutional context, we might better call the “Balkin Window.”7 
Not surprisingly, the far-reaching arguments mentioned in the previous 
paragraph have generated anxiety among religious liberty advocates and 
within the civil rights community.  In addition, commentators coming from 
both perspectives have raised alarm about other supposed “changes” and 
“emerging” developments8 that, in truth, are merely new applications of 
long-settled principles.  Taken together, the truly radical arguments and the 
perceived-to-be-radical trends have contributed to a growing sense that fun-
damental protections—for religious liberty, equal citizenship, or both—are 
in jeopardy.  The actual threat, however, has been largely overstated.  Only 
one genuinely novel argument can claim even a partial victory, and that vic-
tory was neither constitutionally mandated nor based on circumstances that 
are likely to be replicated.9  Indeed, to date, the arguments for sweeping 
change are most notable for their failure to convince judges, legislators, and 
the general public to depart from ingrained instincts about the contexts in 
which the government can and cannot demand adherence to nondiscrimina-
tion norms. 
                                                          
 6.  See Nathan J. Russell, An Introduction to the Overton Window of Political Possibilities, 
MACKINAC CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y (Jan. 4, 2006), https://www.mackinac.org/7504 (describing the 
Overton Window as the range of options on a given issue that are “within the realm of the politi-
cally possible at any time” and explaining how advocates work to “[m]ove the window” so that 
“policies previously impractical can become the next great popular and legislative rage”). 
 7.  See Jack M. Balkin, From Off the Wall to On the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge 
Went Mainstream, ATLANTIC (June 4, 2012), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-
mandate-challenge-went-mainstream/258040/ (“The history of American constitutional develop-
ment, in large part, has been the history of formerly crazy arguments moving from off the wall to 
on the wall, and then being adopted by courts.”). 
 8.  See, e.g., DeGirolami, supra note 3, at 34 (warning of “considerable changes afoot” that 
threaten religious liberty); West, supra note 5, at 5 (warning of “newly emerging” church free-
doms that threaten civil rights).    
 9.  See infra notes 95–101 and accompanying text (discussing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)). 
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Part I of this Paper traces those ingrained instincts to an understanding 
of the public-private distinction that has prevailed since the end of the 
Lochner era.  On the one hand are areas of activity involving the general 
public, where regulation of conduct is pervasive and presumptively consti-
tutional.  On the other hand are areas of activity involving inherently selec-
tive, expressive, or intimate associations, where various liberty or privacy 
interests may preclude regulation of conduct.  More specifically, and of 
greatest relevance to the disputes discussed in this Paper, we have long un-
derstood the regulated public sphere to include “commercial relationship[s] 
offered generally or widely”10 and the protected private sphere to include 
relationships within religious institutions. 
Part II turns to the most prominent context in which the public-private 
distinction is being recontested today: the debate over whether business 
owners have a right to refuse marriage-related goods, services, and benefits 
to same-sex couples.  Cases have already arisen around the country involv-
ing wedding cakes, flowers, photos, and venue spaces, and it seems inevita-
ble that disputes will arise over employee benefits for same-sex spouses.  
Both sides claim that the other is pressing extreme arguments, and in this 
instance, it is those asserting liberty rights for business owners who are tru-
ly pushing the envelope.  So far, however, their constitutional contentions 
have all been rejected in the courts, and their push for legislative relief has 
borne little fruit. 
Part III addresses the ministerial exception, which was the subject of 
the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Luther-
an Church and School v. EEOC.11  Like the wedding cake debate, the de-
bate over the ministerial exception has seen both sides raise alarm about al-
legedly novel claims on the other side.  But in this case, it is those making 
equality arguments against religious institutions that are outside the consti-
tutional mainstream.  They have fared no better, however, than the liberty 
advocates above: their arguments were rejected 9-0 in Hosanna-Tabor, and 
the basic proposition embraced in the lower courts since 1972—that non-
discrimination laws cannot be applied to clergy hiring and firing—remains 
the law of the land. 
Part IV concludes by emphasizing that, to date, the judicial, legislative, 
and cultural verdicts rendered on these two conflicts have all reaffirmed the 
longstanding status quo with respect to the public-private distinction and its 
implications for religious liberty and civil rights. 
                                                          
 10.  Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 189 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 11.  132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
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I.  A KEY PUBLIC-PRIVATE DISTINCTION: OPEN AND COMMERCIAL VERSUS 
INHERENTLY SELECTIVE, EXPRESSIVE, OR INTIMATE 
The core idea behind the public-private distinction is that there are 
some areas of life, constituting a protected “private sphere,” where individ-
ual and associational decisionmaking must remain largely free from gov-
ernmental control.12  The classic example of such an area is the home, 
where an individual’s choice of guests can be subject to no antidiscrimina-
tion law.13  The critical question is how far from the paradigm the private 
sphere extends. 
As Professor Samuel Bagenstos recently detailed, there have long been 
arguments that a business’s choice of customers should be considered a pro-
tected private activity, even if the business is generally open to the public at 
large.14  If ever this view was going to prevail, it would have been during 
the Lochner era, when the Court routinely limited state authority to regulate 
businesses that were deemed insufficiently “affected with a public inter-
est.”15  But even then, the Court declined to protect businesses against the 
                                                          
 12.  See Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 1212 (observing that the “public-private distinction [is] 
understood . . . to preserve a sphere of private, individual choice”); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tut-
tle, Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 274, 280 (2010) 
(discussing the “crucial distinction between public and private realms” and observing that “[o]n 
the private side, the political community has only a limited authority to regulate the bonds of inti-
macy and association”); Carol Nackenoff, Privacy, Police Power, and the Growth of Public Pow-
er in the Early Twentieth Century: A Not So Unlikely Coexistence, 75 MD. L. REV. 312 (2015) 
(“The Court celebrates its legacy of protecting the private realm.”). 
The term “public-private distinction” is sometimes used in a different sense to distinguish be-
tween state actors and non-state actors.  See Gregory P. Magarian, The First Amendment, the Pub-
lic-Private Distinction, and Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime Political Debate, 73 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 101, 127 (2004) (“Mainstream constitutional theory posits a strict distinction be-
tween private actors, who are shielded from constitutional liability . . . , and governmental actors, 
who are subject to constitutional constraints against interference with private actors’ rights.”); cf. 
Leslie Friedman Goldstein, Death and Transfiguration of the State Action Doctrine—Moose 
Lodge v. Irvis to Runyon v. McCrary, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 16 (1977) (contrasting the use 
of the term “public building” in the sense of “state owned and state managed” and the use of the 
terms “public accommodation” and “public restaurant” in the sense of “‘open to the public at 
large,’ or ‘open to the buying public’”). 
 13.  See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 313 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“Prejudice 
and bigotry in any form are regrettable, but it is the constitutional right of every person to close his 
home . . . on the basis of personal prejudices including race.”); Black, supra note 1, at 102 (“Law 
does not, in our legal culture, commonly deal with dinner invitations and the choice of children’s 
back-yard playmates. . . .  [T]he concept of authentic privacy . . . so as to shield the private life 
that is really private, is warranted . . . .”). 
 14.  See Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 1207–08 (“Since the Reconstruction era, continuing 
through the civil rights era to today, public accommodations laws have triggered legal controversy 
over the extent to which antidiscrimination principles should penetrate into spaces that had at one 
time been understood as ‘private’ or ‘social.”); id. at 1210–17 (reviewing the arguments for pro-
tecting choice of customers). 
 15.  Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 239 (1929) (first quoting Ribnik v. McBride, 
277 U.S. 350 (1928); then quoting Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1 (1927); then 
quoting Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927); and then quoting Chas. Wolff Packing 
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operation of state nondiscrimination laws.16  And by 1934, the Court had 
discarded the narrow “public interest” test altogether, explaining in Nebbia 
v. New York that “there is no closed class or category of businesses affected 
with a public interest.”17  Instead, the Court wrote, “[t]he phrase ‘affected 
with a public interest’ can, in the nature of things, mean no more than that 
an industry, for adequate reason, is subject to control for the public good.”18  
And “there can be no doubt that . . . the state may regulate a business in any 
of its aspects.”19 
In the eight decades since Nebbia, lawmakers and jurists have consist-
ently rejected arguments that the Constitution precludes application of non-
discrimination norms in the commercial marketplace.  Those arguments 
were pressed vigorously during the Civil Rights Era,20 but to no avail.  In a 
1963 address to the nation, President Kennedy articulated what would soon 
become an article of faith among most Americans: “It ought to be possible 
for American consumers of any color to receive equal service in places of 
                                                          
Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations of Kan., 262 U.S. 522, 524 (1923)); see Ribnik, 277 U.S. at 357 
(“An employment agency is essentially a private business.  True, it deals with the public, but so do 
the druggist, the butcher, the baker, the grocer, and the apartment or tenement house owner . . . .  
Under the decisions of this court it is no longer fairly open to question that . . . the fixing of prices 
for food or clothing, of house rental or of wages to be paid, whether minimum or maximum, is 
beyond the legislative power.”); Chas. Wolff Packing Co., 262 U.S. at 537 (“[O]ne does not de-
vote one’s property or business to the public use or clothe it with a public interest merely because 
one makes commodities for, and sells to, the public in the common callings . . . .  An ordinary 
producer, manufacturer, or shopkeeper may sell or not sell as he likes . . . .”); Lochner v. New 
York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) (“[W]e think that a law like the one before us involves neither the 
safety, the morals nor the welfare of the public, and that the interest of the public is not in the 
slightest degree affected by such an act.”); Keith Whittington, Some Dilemmas in Drawing the 
Public/Private Distinction in New Deal Era State Constitutional Law, 75 MD. L. REV. 383 (2015) 
(“In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, . . . economic affairs were . . . generally un-
derstood to be ‘private’ . . . and thus insulated from governmental interference . . . .”). 
 16.  See W. Turf Ass’n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 361, 364 (1907) (rejecting a challenge to 
California’s public accommodation law).  Of course, the Court did hold in The Civil Rights Cases 
that Congress lacked authority under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to prohibit dis-
crimination in places of public accommodation, but that decision left unquestioned the authority 
of states to do so.  109 U.S. 3, 24–25 (1883). 
 17.  291 U.S. 502, 536 (1934). 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. at 537.  See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (“It is by now 
well established that legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come to 
the Court with a presumption of constitutionality, and that the burden is on one complaining of a 
due process violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational 
way.”); Whittington, supra note 15, at 383–84 (“[A] key move of modern reform liberalism was 
to shift economic affairs from the private to the public sphere and thus make them more tractable 
to government control.”). 
 20.  See Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 1214–17 (surveying arguments); Linda C. McClain, The 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and “Legislating Morality”: On Conscience, Prejudice, and Whether 
“Stateways” Can Change “Folkways,” 95 B.U. L. REV. 891, 900 n.48 (2015) (noting that 
“[a]rguments about private property and freedom of association featured prominently in opposi-
tions to the CRA, particularly the public accommodations provisions”). 
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public accommodation, such as hotels and restaurants and theaters and retail 
stores.”21  Accordingly, the President called upon “Congress to enact legis-
lation giving all Americans the right to be served in facilities which are 
open to the public.”22  Within thirteen months, Congress had passed the 
landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964,23 which prohibited discrimination in ho-
tels, restaurants, gas stations, and theaters, as well as in the employment 
context.24  Four years later, Congress continued extending nondiscrimina-
tion principles into the marketplace by passing the Fair Housing Act of 
1968.25  And although Congress never went as far as President Kennedy 
urged by extending the public accommodations provision of the 1964 Act to 
cover all businesses open to the public, including retail stores, many states 
did.26 
In upholding the 1964 Act’s public accommodation provision against a 
due process challenge, the Court explained that a business “has no ‘right’ to 
select its guests as it sees fit, free from governmental regulation,” and it 
made a point of noting that “32 States now have such provisions and no 
case has been cited to us where the attack on a state statute has been suc-
cessful, either in federal or state courts.”27  Thirty-one years later, the Court 
                                                          
 21.  Transcript of John F. Kennedy, Address to the Nation (June 11, 1963), 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Civil-Rights-Microsite/Shared-Content/Chapters/Address-to-the-
American-People/The-Address/Tune-in-Tonight.aspx. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
 24.  Title II of the 1964 Act covers the enumerated public accommodations while Title VII 
covers employment. 
 25.  Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968). 
 26.  See, e.g., Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 2012) (enacted in 1959) 
(requiring “full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all 
business establishments of every kind whatsoever”); Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. LYSYJ, 313 
N.E.2d 3, 5–6 (Ohio 1974) (noting that Ohio’s public accommodation law covers “any inn, restau-
rant, eating house, barbershop, public conveyance by air, land, or water, theater, store, or other 
place for the sale of merchandise, or any other place of public accommodation or amusement 
where the accommodation, advantages, facilities, or privileges thereof are available to the pub-
lic,” and construing the “omnibus clause” broadly (emphasis added) (quoting OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN § 4112.01(l) (West 1974))); Public Accommodations: Definition—Oregon, 6 RACE REL. L. 
REP. 644, 644 (1961–1962) (reproducing Oregon’s 1961 law, which covered “[a]ny place offering 
to the public goods or services”).  See generally Wallace F. Caldwell, State Public Accommoda-
tions Laws, Fundamental Liberties and Enforcement Programs, 40 WASH. L. REV. 841, 842–46 
(1965) (cataloging state public accommodations laws, which at the time included thirty with 
broader coverage than the 1964 federal law). 
 27.  Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 259–60 (1964); see Marshall 
v. Kan. City, 355 S.W.2d 877, 880 (Mo. 1962) (“A number of states have adopted statutes de-
signed to secure to all persons equal rights and privileges in places where the public is generally 
served, accommodated or entertained. . . .  ‘Laws containing such guaranties are generally known 
as ‘civil rights statutes,’ and their validity has been made the subject of frequent attack, based up-
on the contention that they violate constitutional provisions prohibiting the deprivation of life, lib-
erty, or property without due process of law.  Where the question has been raised, however, it has 
been held that such legislation is a proper exercise of the police power of the state.’” (quoting 10 
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reiterated that “[p]rovisions like these are well within the State’s usual 
power to enact when a legislature has reason to believe that a given group is 
the target of discrimination, and they do not, as a general matter, violate the 
First or Fourteenth Amendments.”28 
In between those declarations, the Court and individual justices af-
firmed the broad authority of the state to subject commercial relationships 
to nondiscrimination laws in a variety of contexts. 
In the 1976 case of Runyon v. McCrary,29 the Court considered the ap-
plication of Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 186630 to two “commercial-
ly operated, nonsectarian schools.”31  The schools’ educational services 
“were advertised and offered to members of the general public” through the 
Yellow Pages and mass mailings, and those advertisements appealed “to the 
parents of all children in the area who c[ould] meet their academic and oth-
er admission requirements.”32  Having found that the schools’ “actual and 
potential constituency” was “more public than private,” the Court analo-
gized them to “so-called private clubs” that had previously been subjected 
to antidiscrimination laws because they “were open to all objectively quali-
fied whites—i.e., those living within a specified geographic area.”33  
Against that background, the Court rejected the schools’ constitutional de-
fenses,34 noting along the way that the case did not involve “governmental 
                                                          
Am. Jur., Civil Rights, § 8 (1936))); Caldwell, supra note 26, at 870 (“There are no reported cases 
where such statutes have been held unconstitutional.”). 
Although Heart of Atlanta involved a quintessential place of public accommodation—an 
inn—the Court did not limit its holding to such businesses.  See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 
294, 298 & n.1 (1964) (relying on Heart of Atlanta to reject a restaurant owner’s constitutional 
challenge to the 1964 Act).  See generally Joseph William Singer, No Right To Exclude: Public 
Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1292, 1390 (1996) (“[B]efore 
the Civil War, the law probably required all businesses that held themselves out as open to the 
public to serve anyone who sought service. . . .  The common-law rule, as we currently know it—
placing a duty on innkeepers and common carriers but not on other businesses—did not crystallize 
into that form until the post-Civil War period.  The narrowing of the duty to serve the public first 
occurred in the context of claims of a right of access by African-American plaintiffs.  The current 
rule clearly has its origins in a desire to avoid extending common-law rights of access to African-
Americans.”). 
 28.  Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 572–73 (1995).  
The Hurley Court found a constitutional violation only because the Massachusetts statute had been 
“applied in a peculiar way,” not to “address any dispute about the participation of openly gay, les-
bian, or bisexual individuals” in a public parade, but to instead treat the parade sponsor’s “speech 
itself to be the public accommodation” so as to require the sponsor to include competing banners 
undermining its message.  Id. 
 29.  427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
 30.  42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2015). 
 31.  Runyon, 427 U.S. at 168. 
 32.  Id. at 172, 172 n.10. 
 33.  Id. at 172–73, 172 n.10. 
 34.  Id. at 175–79. 
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intrusion into the privacy of the home or a similarly intimate setting”35 and 
did “not present any question of the right of a private social organization to 
limit its membership.”36 
In his Runyon concurrence, Justice Powell took the opportunity to 
elaborate on the public-private distinction.37  The three key takeaways from 
Justice Powell’s opinion are as follows: 
 (1) Relationships that are both open to the public generally and 
commercial in nature are on the “public” side of the line.  Justice Powell’s 
term for this category—“commercial relationship offered generally or wide-
ly”38—remains one of the most helpful ever offered. 
 (2) Non-commercial relationships can also fall on the “public” side 
of the line if they are open to large portions of the public indiscriminately 
(e.g., recreational associations with “no plan or purpose of exclusiveness” 
that are “open to every white person in the geographic area”).39 
 (3) Commercial relationships can fall on the “private” side of the 
line if they are “personal contractual relationships” in which “the offeror 
selects those with whom he desires to bargain on an individualized basis, or 
where the contract is the foundation of a close association” (e.g., relation-
ships established with babysitters, housekeepers, and private tutors).40 
In the third situation, unlike the first two, Justice Powell explained that 
“there is reason to assume that, although the choice made by the offeror is 
selective, it reflects ‘a purpose of exclusiveness’ other than the desire to bar 
members of the Negro race.  Such a purpose, certainly in most cases, would 
invoke associational rights long respected.”41  But that was not the case of 
the schools in Runyon, which were “operated strictly on a commercial ba-
sis”42 and made an “open offer to the public.”43  That type of transaction, 
                                                          
 35.  Id. at 178. 
 36.  Id. at 167. 
 37.  Id. at 187–89 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 38.  Id. at 189. 
 39.  Id. at 187 (discussing Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969), and 
Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., 410 U.S. 431 (1978)).  For a very illuminating dis-
cussion of a modern example in this category, see Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 12, at 279–82 (exam-
ining Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n, No. PN34XB-03008 (N.J. Dep’t of Law 
and Pub. Safety) (Dec. 29, 2008), http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases08/pr20081229a-Bernstein-
v-OGCMA.pdf). 
 40.  Runyon, 427 U.S. at 187 (Powell, J., concurring); see id. at 188 (suggesting that the pro-
tected private realm might also include a “small kindergarten or music class, operated on the basis 
of personal invitations extended to a limited number of preidentified students”).  See generally 
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 12, at 281 (“The distinction between public and private focuses on the 
scope of invitation and the character of the use.”). 
 41.  Id. at 187–88. 
 42.  Id. at 188. 
 43.  Id. at 189. 
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Powell reiterated, “is simply not a ‘private’ contract” in the sense of “an in-
dividual entering into a personal relationship.”44 
In the years following Runyon, the Court continued to validate state 
authority to apply nondiscrimination norms to commercial relationships that 
were not essentially private and personal in nature.  In Hishon v. King & 
Spalding,45 the Court held that Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination 
could be applied to a large law firm’s denial of a candidate for partner-
ship.46  In Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,47 the Court held that a state public ac-
commodations law could be applied to a membership organization that was 
“neither small nor selective”48 and that offered “various commercial pro-
grams and benefits” to its members.49  Concurring separately in Jaycees, 
Justice O’Connor placed even greater emphasis on the fact that the Jaycees 
were a commercial organization.  “The Constitution,” she wrote, “does not 
guarantee a right to choose employees, customers, suppliers, or those with 
whom one engages in simple commercial transactions, without restraint 
from the State.  A shopkeeper has no constitutional right to deal only with 
persons of one sex.”50  In New York State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New 
York,51 the Court upheld against a facial challenge a public accommoda-
                                                          
 44.  Id.  In an early and important assessment of Runyon, Professor Leslie Goldstein wrote 
that the justices “faced more directly than ever before the crucial question of where to draw the 
line between the public and the private spheres.”  Goldstein, supra note 12, at 33.  Consistent with 
the analysis offered here, Goldstein read the majority and concurring opinions in Runyon as teach-
ing that nondiscrimination norms could “reach as far as the civic life itself, certainly including the 
whole world of essentially commercial transactions,” but could “not extend into the protected 
sphere of truly private life, even though there may be some contracting or some buying and selling 
in that private sphere.”  Id. at 31. 
 45.  467 U.S. 69 (1984). 
 46.  Id. at 71–78.  See also Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 920 F.2d 967, 979–80 (D.C. Cir. 
1990) (reaching the same result with respect to an accounting firm’s partnership decision). 
 47.  468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 48.  Id. at 621 (“Apart from age and sex, neither the national organization nor the local chap-
ters employ any criteria for judging applicants for membership, and new members are routinely 
recruited and admitted with no inquiry into their backgrounds.”). 
 49.  Id. at 625–26 (“Like many States and municipalities, Minnesota has adopted a functional 
definition of public accommodations that reaches various forms of public, quasi-commercial con-
duct.  This expansive definition reflects a recognition of the changing nature of the American 
economy and of the importance, both to the individual and to society, of removing the barriers to 
economic advancement and political and social integration that have historically plagued certain 
disadvantaged groups, including women.” (first citing U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 
768 (1981); then citing California v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) (per curiam); then citing 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–86 (1973) (plurality opinion); then citing Brief for 
Nat’l League of Cities, et al. at 15–16, Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 428 U.S. 609 (1984) (No. 83-
724)). 
 50.  Id. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  But see Richard W. Garnett, Jaycees Reconsid-
ered: Judge Richard S. Arnold and the Freedom of Association, 58 ARK. L. REV. 587, 589–90 
(2005) (discussing how Judge Arnold viewed the Jaycees case as one concerning the rights of “a 
private, non-commercial association”) (emphasis added).   
 51.  487 U.S. 1 (1988). 
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tions ordinance that utilized objective criteria “in pinpointing organizations 
which are ‘commercial’ in nature, ‘where business deals are often made and 
personal contacts valuable for business purposes, employment and profes-
sional advancement are formed.’”52  Concurring again, and this time joined 
by Justice Kennedy, Justice O’Connor emphasized that “[p]redominately 
commercial organizations are not entitled to claim a First Amendment asso-
ciational or expressive right to be free from the anti-discrimination provi-
sions triggered by [a public accommodations] law.”53  And the Court sub-
sequently confirmed in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale54 that the 
commercial-noncommercial distinction plays a critical role in free associa-
tion cases: “As the definition of ‘public accommodation’ has expanded 
from clearly commercial entities, such as restaurants, bars, and hotels, to 
membership organizations such as the Boy Scouts, the potential for conflict 
between state public accommodations laws and the First Amendment rights 
of organizations has increased.”55 
The same basic themes running through the Court’s privacy and free 
association cases, involving an overarching public-private distinction in-
formed by a subsidiary commercial-noncommercial distinction, have long 
played out in discourse about religious liberty rights.  Writing in 1944, Jus-
tice Jackson offered the following “principle of separating immune reli-
gious activities from secular ones” that can be limited by government regu-
lation: 
 I think the limits begin to operate whenever activities begin to 
affect or collide with liberties of others or of the public.  Reli-
gious activities which concern only members of the faith are and 
ought to be free—as nearly absolutely free as anything can be.  
But beyond these, many religious denominations or sects engage 
in collateral and secular activities intended to obtain means from 
unbelievers to sustain the worshippers and their leaders.  They 
raise money, not merely by passing the plate to those who volun-
tarily attend services or by contributions by their own people, but 
by solicitations and drives addressed to the public by holding 
public dinners and entertainments, by various kinds of sales and 
Bingo games and lotteries.  All such money-raising activities on a 
public scale are, I think, Caesar’s affairs and may be regulated by 
the state so long as it does not discriminate against one because 
he is doing them for a religious purpose, and the regulation is not 
                                                          
 52.  Id. at 12 (citing New York Local Law No. 63 of 1984, § 1, App. 15). 
 53.  Id. at 20 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 54.  530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 55.  Id. at 657 (emphasis added). 
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arbitrary and capricious, in violation of other provisions of the 
Constitution.56 
Consistent with Jackson’s view, the Court held in 1982 that “[w]hen 
followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of 
choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of con-
science and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes 
which are binding on others in that activity.”57  Accordingly, the Court re-
fused to grant an exemption to an employer who had sincere religious ob-
jections to the Social Security system, explaining that to do so would “oper-
ate[] to impose the employer’s religious faith on the employees.”58  The 
Court reached a similar conclusion, more emphatically and summarily, in 
an earlier case involving a restaurant owner who raised a free exercise chal-
lenge to application of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.59  Professor Douglas Lay-
cock aptly described the state of the law in 1998 testimony to Congress, 
when he explained that “courts have never disagreed that in the outside-
world, religiously motivated people have to comply with the civil rights 
law.”60 
But while a “religiously motivated citizen” who “participates in gov-
ernment or the secular economy . . . must obey the secular rules that apply 
to all,” the “internal affairs of churches are an enclave where the free exer-
cise clause must control.”61  Accordingly, the federal circuit courts have 
long recognized a “ministerial exception” that shields religious institutions 
from liability under civil rights laws for decisions regarding their ministeri-
al employees.62  And the Supreme Court unanimously endorsed the ministe-
                                                          
 56.  Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177–78 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 57.  United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982). 
 58.  Id.; cf. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011) (“[T]he government’s 
legitimate interest in protecting consumers from ‘commercial harms’ explains ‘why commercial 
speech can be subject to greater governmental regulation than noncommercial speech.’”). 
 59.  See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402–03 n.5 (1968) (per curiam) 
(rejecting as “patently frivolous” a restaurant owner’s argument that, by prohibiting racial discrim-
ination, the 1964 Civil Rights Act “constitute[d] an interference with the ‘free exercise of the De-
fendant’s religion’” (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 377 F.2d 433, 437–38 (4th Cir. 
1967))). 
 60.  Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of 
the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R. on H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. 238 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 House 
Hearing]. 
 61.  Douglas Laycock, Tax Exemptions for Racially Discriminatory Schools, 60 TEX. L. REV. 
259, 263 (1982). 
 62.  See, e.g., McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972).  See generally 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 705, 705–06 n.2 
(2012) (“Since the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . and other employment 
discrimination laws, the Courts of Appeals have uniformly recognized the existence of a ‘ministe-
rial exception,’ grounded in the First Amendment, that precludes application of such legislation to 
claims concerning the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers.”) 
(collecting cases). 
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rial exception in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. 
EEOC,63 explaining that the Constitution “gives special solicitude to the 
rights of religious organizations.”64 
To summarize, and to borrow phrasing from Professor Paul Horwitz, 
American law has long treated the commercial marketplace as an “egalitari-
an space,” and there has been widespread acceptance of a distinction “be-
tween commercial and noncommercial institutions . . . for freedom of asso-
ciation as well as religious exercise purposes.”65  Horwitz maintains that 
this distinction has been “undertheorized,”66 but surely that cannot be said 
of the public-private distinction writ large.67  And the placement of “com-
mercial relationships offered generally or widely” on one side of the line 
and “ministerial relations” on the other fits comfortably with the well-
established, post-Lochner understanding of the distinction.68 
                                                          
 63.  132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
 64.  Id. at 706. 
 65.  Horwitz, supra note 2, at 179 (“Even those who take a robust view of free exercise or 
associational rights are inclined to respect this distinction, if only for pragmatic reasons.  To fail to 
respect it falls, for most people in polite legal circles, into the realm of ‘unutterability.’” (footnote 
omitted) (citing John D. Inazu, The Four Freedoms and the Future of Religious Liberty, 92 N.C. 
L. REV. 787, 828–29 (2014); Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Federalism’s Text, 66 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1218, 1220–21 (1998))). 
 66.  Id.  But cf. Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial 
Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298, 324 (1998) (describing “the principle that government 
must have broad authority to regulate business affairs” as one of “the most well-thought-out and 
deeply theorized principles in constitutional law”). 
 67.  See Howard Schweber, Legal Epistemologies, 75 MD. L. REV. 210 (2015) (“The idea that 
conduct that is self-directed is outside the reach of legitimate public control is the central premise 
of liberalism. . . . The Millian liberal conception of the public/private has been the subject of end-
less and often fruitful critique . . . .  But the basic idea that ‘public’ means ‘affecting others’ has 
been and remains a central element of constitutional law by way of tort doctrine and police powers 
jurisprudence.”); see also Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling out Religion, 50 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 18 (2000) (observing that the “general idea of separation between public and 
private . . . is central to liberalism”); Robert H. Mnookin, The Public/Private Dichotomy: Political 
Disagreement and Academic Repudiation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1429, 1429 (1982) (“The distinction 
between public and private connects with a central tenet of liberal thought: the insistence that be-
cause individuals have rights, there are limits on the power of government vis-a-vis the individu-
al.”). 
 68.  See text accompanying supra notes 20–55; see also Mnookin, supra note 67, at 1432 
(writing in 1982 that “the trends of the last fifty years—both legislative and judicial—certainly 
suggest that the economic realm has generally come to be seen as more public, while the sphere of 
activities centering around intimate association is viewed as more private”); Joseph William Sing-
er, We Don’t Serve Your Kind Here: Public Accommodations and The Mark of Sodom, 95 B.U. L. 
REV. 929, 939 (2015) (“Our constitutional structure distinguishes between areas of social and po-
litical life where groups are presumptively entitled to be exclusionary (such as religion or political 
associations) and areas of life where access without regard to race or other caste designations is 
presumptively prohibited—and the main area of life to which the equal access norm applies is the 
parts of the economy that are open to the general public.”). 
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II.  WEDDING CAKES AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
Against the settled background discussed in Part I, the question of 
whether the state can require businesses to provide equal goods and services 
to same-sex couples would not appear difficult.  Bakers, florists, commer-
cial photographers, and for-profit banquet halls typically open their doors to 
the public at large, and to date, courts and civil rights commissions have not 
hesitated to treat such businesses as public accommodations that can be 
subjected to nondiscrimination laws.69  And although considerable efforts 
have been made to convince states to enact legislative exemptions that 
would allow business owners to refuse marriage-related goods, services, 
and benefits on religious grounds, no state has yet done so.70 
Notwithstanding the consistency of these results with past practice in 
analogous areas,71 the failure to secure exemptions for objecting business 
owners has helped fuel dire rhetoric about the state of religious freedom in 
the United States.72  Perhaps the most prominent academic example is Pro-
fessor Paul Horwitz’s Harvard Law Review Comment on Burwell v. Hobby 
                                                          
 69.  See Elane Photography, LLC v. Wilcock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013); Washington v. Ar-
lene’s Flowers, Inc., No. 13-2-00871-5, 2015 WL 720213 (Wash. Super. Ct. Feb 18, 2015); 
Melissa Klein, Nos. 44-14 & 45-14 (Ore. Bureau of Lab. & Indus. July 2, 2015) (order) (ALJ); 
McCarthy v. Liberty Ridge Farm, LLC, Nos. 10157952 & 10157963 (N.Y. Div. Hum. Rts. Aug. 
8, 2014) (final order); Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., No. CR 2013-0008 (Colo. Office of 
Admin. Courts Dec. 6, 2013) (initial decision) (ALJ), aff’d, No. CR 2013-0008 (Colo. Civ. Rights 
Comm’n June 2, 2014) (final order); see also Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enter-
prise of Religious Exemptions, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 35, 93 (2015) (describing cases “that 
involve employer objections to paying family benefits to employees with same-sex spouses” as 
“the next wave of RFRA possibilities”). 
 70.  See James M. Oleske, Jr., “State Inaction,” Equal Protection, and Religious Resistance 
to LGBT Rights, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 4 n.4, 9–11(2015) (manuscript at 104 n.4, 109–110), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2589743 (discussing the academic lobbying effort for such exemptions 
that began in 2009 and the numerous legislative proposals that have followed).  The Supreme 
Court’s recent ruling that all states must recognize same-sex marriage, see Obergefell v. Hodges, 
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), has prompted a renewed focus on the exemption debate.  See Erik Eck-
holm, Conservative Lawmakers and Faith Groups Seek Exemptions After Same-Sex Ruling, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/conservative-lawmakers-and-
faith-groups-seek-exemptions-after-same-sex-ruling.html?_r=0; Rachel Zoll & Steve Peoples, 
Religious Liberty Is Rallying Cry After Gay Marriage Ruling, ASSOCIATED PRESS,  (June 29, 
2015), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/a050a5a384564f858bb7ba8ec2674149/religious-liberty-
rallying-cry-after-gay-marriage-ruling. 
 71.  See James M. Oleske, Jr., The Evolution of Accommodation: Comparing the Unequal 
Treatment of Religious Objections to Interracial and Same-Sex Marriages, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 99, 145–46 (2015) (noting that “no state has ever exempted commercial business owners 
from the obligation to provide equal services for interracial marriages, interfaith marriages, or 
marriages involving divorced individuals—even though major religious traditions in America 
have opposed each type of marriage”). 
 72.  See Nelson Tebbe, The End of Religious Freedom: What Is at Stake, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 
963, 963 (2014) (“Warnings can be heard today that the American tradition of religious freedom is 
newly imperiled and may even be nearing exhaustion.”); id. at 964 (observing that the fears are 
influenced by “a sense that the culture wars are over and that they have been won by the forces of 
secular liberalism,” particularly “in the area of LGBT rights”). 
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Stores Inc.73  Although the fiercely debated Hobby Lobby decision involved 
a commercial exemption claim outside the gay rights context,74 Horwitz ac-
curately notes that the issue of “[h]ow to reconcile religious objections and 
LGBT equality . . . remains very much in the foreground of current contes-
tation.”75  Specifically, Horwitz takes note of the “legal issues concerning 
the religiously motivated conscientious refusal to provide services to gays 
and lesbians in relation to same-sex marriages” and the “acrimonious state 
by state debate over proposed religious accommodations” that “would have 
allowed business owners with religious objections” to assert a defense “if 
sued by private parties invoking state or local antidiscrimination laws.”76 
Extrapolating from the specific controversy about extending religious 
exemptions into the commercial realm—a key contested issue in both Hob-
by Lobby and the ongoing refusal-to-serve debate—Horwitz argues that the 
general “consensus in favor of accommodation of religion . . . seems to 
have weakened, if not collapsed.”77  As I have explained elsewhere, this 
dramatic leap is difficult to square with the ongoing, cross-ideological sup-
port for religious accommodations outside the commercial realm.78  Yet, 
Horwitz is far from alone in warning of the possible demise of religious ac-
commodation.79  In a striking new essay entitled Free Exercise by Moon-
light, Professor Marc DeGirolami claims that we have reached “the evening 
of religious accommodation.”80  DeGirolami’s central concern is what he 
describes as “the recent emergence of theories” that would vindicate “new 
dignitary and other third party” interests under a “relentlessly expanding 
                                                          
 73.  134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); see Horwitz, supra note 2. 
 74.  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751 (granting a religious accommodation pursuant to the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) to a for-profit business that objected to in-
cluding coverage for emergency contraception in its health plan for employees). 
 75.  Horwitz, supra note 2, at 176. 
 76.  Id. at 174–75; see id. at 160 (“Same-sex marriage and its consequences have become a 
central, foregrounded, socially contested issue.”). 
 77.  Id. at 170; see id. at 155 (asserting that “the very notion of religious liberty . . . has be-
come an increasingly contested subject”); id. at 159 (“Until recently, there was widespread ap-
proval for religious accommodation. . . . The past few years have witnessed a significant weaken-
ing of this consensus.”); id. at 160 (“The church-state consensus . . . has been put up for 
grabs . . . .”); id. at 170 (“A substantial body of opinion on this issue has moved from the view that 
[the Court] erred grievously by rejecting the prior regime of free exercise exemptions from gener-
ally applicable law, to the view that legislative exemptions are permitted but subject to careful 
cabining, to a broader questioning of religious accommodations altogether.” (footnote omitted) 
(citing Douglas Laycock, The Religious Exemption Debate, 2 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 139, 
157–63 (2009))). 
 78.  James M. Oleske, Jr., The Born-Again Champion of Conscience, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 
75, 87–90 (2015).  See generally Elizabeth Sepper, Reports of Accommodation’s Death Have 
Been Greatly Exaggerated, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 24 (2014). 
 79.  See Tebbe, supra note 72, at 963 (noting similar concerns raised by Professors Steven 
Smith and Douglas Laycock). 
 80.  DeGirolami, supra note 3, at 3. 
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body of antidiscrimination norms,” resulting in “surprising understandings 
of the limits of religious accommodation.”81 
But there is nothing “new” or “surprising” about the government using 
civil rights laws to prevent dignitary harms in the commercial marketplace.  
As the Court explained in Heart of Atlanta, the “fundamental object of Title 
II [of the 1964 Civil Rights Act] was to vindicate ‘the deprivation of per-
sonal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public es-
tablishments.’”82  Likewise, in upholding the application of Minnesota’s 
public accommodations law in Jaycees, the Court emphasized the “stigma-
tizing injury” of being denied “equal access to public establishments,” 
which it concluded was “surely felt as strongly by persons suffering dis-
crimination on the basis of their sex as by those treated differently because 
of their race.”83  And the use of third-party harm theory to limit accommo-
dations in the commercial marketplace is not novel, as that is precisely what 
the Court did in Lee,84 acting in accord with Justice Jackson’s suggestion 
forty years earlier.85 
Although he does not address this past precedent for vindicating digni-
tary interests and preventing third-party harms in the commercial market-
place, Professor DeGirolami does indicate that the situation is different to-
day due to the “modern expansion of the reach of the state” in creating 
entitlements and broadening antidiscrimination norms.86  DeGirolami posits 
that this expansion has resulted in more ways for people to be negatively 
impacted by government accommodation of religious objections, which has 
resulted in “the growing unpopularity of religious accommodation.”87 This 
theory, however, does not fit comfortably with the historical record.  By all 
accounts, the high-water mark of bipartisan political support for religious 
                                                          
 81.  Id. at 7, 34; see id. at 22 (identifying “the growing unpopularity of religious accommoda-
tion” with the “modern expansion of the reach of the state,” particularly in protecting against dig-
nitary harms); id. at 32 (“The government’s vindication of third-party dignitary harms has the po-
tential to destroy religious accommodation.”). 
 82.  Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964).  See generally 
Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in 
Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2574–78 (2015) (discussing the dignitary harms 
caused by refusals of service). 
 83.  Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 
U.S. at 250). 
 84.  See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 85.  See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 86.  DeGirolami, supra note 3, at 22–23, 34; see also Ryan T. Anderson, Why Is Religious 
Freedom at Risk?, FIRST THINGS (July 28, 2015), http://www.firstthings.com/web-
exclusives/2015/07/why-is-religious-freedom-at-risk-3-historical-developments-explain-it (con-
tending that “a change in the scope of our government” is partially to blame for “religious liberty 
now losing so much ground”). 
 87.  DeGirolami, supra note 3, at 22. 
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accommodation came in 1993,88 long after the New Deal and Great Society 
expansions of the modern state.89  Moreover, the high-water mark for con-
stitutional accommodation rights came in the 1960s and 1970s alongside 
the adoption and expansion of antidiscrimination laws, but never in deroga-
tion of those laws in the commercial marketplace.  Given this history, it 
seems that today’s controversies over religious accommodations have less 
to do with the changing nature of the modern state and more to do with so-
cietal trends that are being fiercely resisted on religious grounds.  That is 
not a new phenomenon, as the nation went through something very similar 
in the 1960s with respect to interracial marriage.90 
What is novel today is the argument that, during this period of change, 
business owners should be granted religious exemptions to continue engag-
ing in discrimination that is otherwise being prohibited in the marketplace.91  
As noted above, that argument has not yet borne any fruit.92  Also bearing 
no fruit so far is the more radical libertarian argument that, in competitive 
markets where customers have other options, businesses have a right to dis-
criminate “whether the lines of difference are race, religion, or sexual orien-
tation.”93  Although the notion that America will re-embrace a form of sepa-
rate-but-equal in the commercial marketplace seems far-fetched,94 Professor 
Bagenstos has suggested that the prospect is not as implausible as it may 
appear.  Writing prior to the Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc.,95 Bagenstos expressed concern that if the Court ruled for the 
company in its challenge to the Affordable Care Act’s “contraception man-
date” (which the Court did), it would “collapse the expressive-commercial 
distinction” that limits the impact of the Court’s freedom of association 
holding in Boy Scout of America v. Dale, and it would be “a very short leap 
                                                          
 88.  See Horwitz, supra note 2, at 169 (discussing the “widely held view” when RFRA passed 
that “religious accommodations and exemptions are a good thing”). 
 89.  Notably, the 1982 Lee case involved Social Security, a massive entitlement program. 
 90.  See Oleske, supra note 71, at 107–09, 118 (discussing the depth of religious opposition to 
interracial marriage on both religious and natural law grounds). 
 91.  See id., at 104–07 (outlining the discrepancy in detail); see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra 
note 12, at 288 (“[T]he proposed exemption invites skepticism and careful scrutiny because it is 
legally anomalous.  In no other respects are individuals and for-profit entities excused, on reli-
gious grounds, from compliance with non-discrimination laws.”). 
 92.  See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 93.  See Richard A. Epstein, Public Accommodations Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964: 
Why Freedom of Association Counts as a Human Right, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1282 (2014). 
 94.  A simple hypothetical is useful in testing the appetite for the full-blown libertarian argu-
ment (as well as the free speech argument that is often made by business owners who oppose 
same-sex marriage): If an interracial couple walks into a bakery and asks for a wedding cake with 
the words “Congratulations, Richard and Mildred” on top, does the proprietor have a right to turn 
them away so long as there is another bakery in town that will sell them such a cake? 
 95.  134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
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to say that those [for-profit] corporations have speech and associational 
rights against the application of public accommodations laws.”96 
Yet, the leap is not short at all because the exemption claim in Hobby 
Lobby was brought under a statute—the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act—not the Constitution.97  Bagenstos acknowledges the statutory nature 
of the claim in Hobby Lobby,98 but understates its importance.99  Hobby 
Lobby was not a case about whether Congress could constitutionally regu-
late certain decisions in the commercial realm, but rather, whether it had 
chosen not to regulate those decisions by virtue of its enactment of 
RFRA.100  And the decision provides little basis for concluding that “liber-
tarian skeptics have put themselves in a position to threaten even the core 
applications of public accommodations laws.”101 
                                                          
 96.  See Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 1220, 1237–39.  Bagenstos also saw a threat to the ex-
pressive-commercial distinction in free speech claims being made in cases like Elane Photog-
raphy.  See id. at 1233–37.  Given that all ten judges who heard that case, from the trial court to 
the New Mexico Supreme Court, rejected the business owner’s free-speech argument, and given 
the similar results that have obtained in every other wedding vendor case to date, see supra note 
69, the threat does not appear dire. 
 97.  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014). 
 98.  Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 1237–38. 
 99.  After initially noting that “the courts could say that ruling for the contraceptive mandate’s 
challengers would not undermine the expressive-commercial distinction in free speech or free as-
sociation cases,” Bagenstos proceeds to argue that constitutional speech and associational rights 
against the application of public accommodations laws may follow “a fortiori” from the recogni-
tion of statutory religious exemption rights in Hobby Lobby.  Id. at 1239.  “The implications of the 
contraceptive mandate cases for the public accommodations context,” Bagenstos concludes, “are 
therefore likely to be significant.” Id. at 1239–40.  
 100.  See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2767 (“By enacting RFRA, Congress went far beyond 
what this Court has held is constitutionally required.”).  As I have noted elsewhere, I am skeptical 
of the Hobby Lobby Court’s conclusion that RFRA represented a choice by Congress to extend 
religious exemption rights into the commercial realm.  See Oleske, supra note 71, at 131 n.165. 
But that is a disagreement over what Congress has chosen, which is a fundamentally different is-
sue than what the Constitution prevents legislators from choosing.    
This is an important distinction to keep in mind as states continue to debate the consequences 
of same-sex marriage.  Although ordinary commercial businesses do not have a constitutional 
right of immunity from civil rights laws (whether on free association, free exercise, or privacy 
grounds), policymakers could conceivably choose to place certain businesses outside the reach of 
such laws on prudential grounds.  In other words, the fact that most commercial retailers and ser-
vice providers fall comfortably within the public realm and can be subject to government regula-
tion of their customer relations does not necessarily mean government will regulate all those rela-
tions.  But cf. Oleske, supra note 70, at 39–62 (contending that, if a state broadly protects against 
other types of invidious discrimination in the marketplace, the Equal Protection Clause obligates it 
to protect against sexual-orientation discrimination in the marketplace). 
 101.  Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 1233.  This is especially so given that the Court cabined its 
decision by emphasizing that accommodating Hobby Lobby’s objection would have “precisely 
zero” effect on its female employees.  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2760.  That rationale would not 
be a comfortable fit in cases where businesses are seeking exemptions that would allow them to 
refuse services to customers.  See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (highlighting 
the “stigmatizing injury” of being denied “equal access to public establishments” (quoting Heart 
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964))).  But cf. Hands on Originals, 
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In sum, states remain free to pass civil rights laws that require busi-
nesses to provide equal services to same-sex couples, and when they do so, 
they act in accord with a long-settled understanding of the commercial mar-
ketplace as an egalitarian public sphere. 
III.  THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION AND THE PRIVATE SPHERE 
Equally settled is the idea that the First Amendment “precludes appli-
cation of [civil rights] legislation to claims concerning the employment re-
lationship between a religious institution and its ministers.”102  This repre-
sents the unanimous view of the current Supreme Court, and it is supported 
by broad scholarly consensus.103  Nonetheless, the Court’s 2012 affirmance 
of the “ministerial exception” in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church and School v. EEOC is not without its critics. 
One of those critics is Professor Robin West, who offers dire warnings 
about the consequences of the ministerial exception for civil rights.  The 
warnings begin in the title of her essay on Hosanna-Tabor, which includes 
the ominous phrase, “Freedom of the Church and our Endangered Civil 
Rights.”104  In the body of her essay, West refers critically to “the ‘Freedom 
of the Church’ to ignore the dictates of our various Civil Rights Acts,”105 
and she treats this freedom as something newly “created” by the Court in 
                                                          
Inc. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Human Rights Comm’n, Civ. No. 14-CI-04474 (Fayette Cir. 
Ct. Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.adfmedia.org/files/HandsOnOriginalsDecision.pdf (relying on 
Hobby Lobby in the course of holding that a print shop with a stated policy and established prac-
tice of refusing to print messages contrary to the owners’ beliefs had a right under a state religious 
accommodation statute to refuse to print t-shirts with a gay-rights message). See generally Eliza-
beth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453 (2015) (arguing that Hobby 
Lobby exemplifies a new phenomenon in which religious liberty claims are reinforced by econom-
ic libertarianism).   
 102.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 705 
(2012). 
 103.  See, e.g., IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, RELIGIOUS 
PEOPLE 73 (2014); Thomas C. Berg et al., Religious Freedom, Church-State Separation, and the 
Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. U.L. REV. COLLOQUY 175, 175–76 (2011); Christopher C. Lund, 
In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2011); Michael W. McConnell, Re-
flections on Hosanna-Tabor, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 821, 821–823 (2012). 
It is important to note that supporters of the ministerial exception do not all agree as to the 
proper rationale for the doctrine.  See LUPU & TUTTLE, supra, at 43–44 & n.2 (rejecting argu-
ments that ground the exception in broad notions of “church autonomy” and “freedom of the 
church,” and instead justifying the exception based on “the limited competence of civil authority 
in religious matters”). 
 104.  West, supra note 5. 
 105.  Id. at 5.  See id. at 4 (“[I]t is not at all clear why our nation’s ministers, rabbis, and 
imams, whether they are ministering or teaching, should not be drawn from the full and diverse 
American public . . . .  It is even less clear why the churches, synagogues, and mosques that hire 
and fire them should be explicitly permitted to do so partly on the basis of their race, sex, age, 
ethnicity, or able-bodied-ness.”). 
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Hosanna-Tabor.106  West concludes with a series of specific admonitions 
about the profound impacts of this new right: 
• The “rending of a unified social fabric is the hidden but substantial 
 cost of all exit rights, including, perhaps quintessentially, the institu
 tional ‘Freedom of the Church’ articulated in Hosanna-Tabor.”107  
• “What is jettisoned . . . is the aspiration of a civil rights society in a 
 much larger sense.”108 
• “When we set aside our civil rights to enter in order to make room for a 
 Church’s freedom to exit, we are setting aside . . . a particular concep
 tion of our rights tradition.”109 
• “The shutting down of the civil rights aspiration . . . is a profound, mis
 guided, and I believe, a tragic compromise of the promise of our civil 
 society.”110 
The idea that Hosanna-Tabor created a new right to church autonomy 
that threatens to shut down our civil rights aspirations in tragic fashion is 
not easy to reconcile with developments over the past four decades.  As the 
Hosanna-Tabor Court noted, the federal courts of appeals had already “uni-
formly recognized the existence of a ‘ministerial exception,’ grounded in 
the First Amendment,” and they began doing so forty years prior to the 
Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor.111  In other words, the exception has 
been with us for almost as long as the landmark 1960s civil rights acts 
themselves, and if the exception posed an existential threat to the civil 
rights project, one would have expected to have heard about it previously.  
Moreover, although there was no opportunity for the courts to recognize a 
ministerial exception prior to efforts to enforce the civil rights acts against 
religious institutions, it follows from the basic principle Justice Jackson laid 
                                                          
 106.  Id. at 11 (referring to the “right to the ministerial exception created in Hosanna-Tabor”); 
id. at 12 (“In both Hobby Lobby and Hosanna-Tabor, the Court created rights of religious believ-
ers to exit our civic society . . . .”); see id. at 10 (“Hosanna-Tabor is one clear, even paradigmatic, 
example of the creation and then the enforcement of an exit right.”).  Elsewhere, West uses less 
definitive phrases: “created or at least newly discovered,” “recognized or created,” and “recog-
nized and broadened.”  Id. at 5, 9, 28. 
 107.  Id. at 29–30. 
 108.  Id. at 30.  As noted above, not all supporters of the ministerial exception view it as part of 
a broad “freedom of the church.”  See supra note 103.  Thus, West’s framing of the ministerial 
exception as a quintessential “exit right” rests on a contested predicate.  See Ira C. Lupu & Robert 
W. Tuttle, Religious Exemptions and the Limited Relevance of Corporate Identity, in THE RISE OF 
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Zoe Robinson et al. eds.) (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 
39), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2535991 (“Religious exemptions are not a function of private free-
doms, of the church or otherwise.  Instead, they arise primarily from an understanding of what 
government may not appraise, decide, or support.”). 
 109. West, supra note 5, at 30.  
 110.  Id. at 31. 
 111.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 705, 
710 (2012); see also Berg et al., supra note 103, at 176 (“[O]ver the last forty years every federal 
circuit has adopted some version of the ministerial exception.”). 
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out in 1944: “Religious activities which concern only members of the faith 
are and ought to be free—as nearly absolutely free as anything can be.”112 
Of course, one can certainly disagree with that principle,113 but it is 
simply not accurate to characterize it as new.  By insisting otherwise and 
framing the ministerial exception as a novel and daunting threat to our civil 
rights aspirations, Professor West detracts from the more fundamental and 
interesting point in her essay noting that “‘civil rights’ and ‘exit rights’ are 
very often in tension.”114  Claiming that the tension has suddenly reached 
perilous new heights because of the decision in Hosanna-Tabor is no more 
convincing than the claims that the application of nondiscrimination norms 
to religious objectors in the commercial marketplace poses a novel threat to 
religious freedom.115 
There was, however, one genuinely significant development surround-
ing the Hosanna-Tabor case, and that was the government decision to urge 
the Court to reject the idea of a categorical ministerial exception based in 
the Religion Clauses and instead require religious institutions to rely on free 
association claims that would be subject to interest-balancing.116  The 
Court’s response was apparent shock: 
 We find this position untenable.  The right to freedom of asso-
ciation is a right enjoyed by religious and secular groups alike.  It 
follows under the EEOC’s . . . view that the First Amendment 
analysis should be the same, whether the association in question 
is the Lutheran Church, a labor union, or a social club.  That re-
sult is hard to square with the text of the First Amendment itself, 
which gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organiza-
tions.  We cannot accept the remarkable view that the Religion 
Clauses have nothing to say about a religious organization’s free-
dom to select its own ministers.117 
                                                          
 112.  Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 113.  For a thorough pre-Hosanna-Tabor critique of the ministerial exception, see Caroline 
Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from Antidis-
crimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965 (2007). 
 114.  West, supra note 5, at 8. 
 115.  See supra notes 82–90 and accompanying text. 
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theran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 705 (2012) (No. 10-553), 
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(2012) (citing Brief of Perich at 31, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
Recent years have seen a number of arguments arising out of religious 
liberty disputes that, if successful, would have meaningfully altered our set-
tled understanding of the public-private distinction.  One of those argu-
ments would have reduced the size of the protected private sphere by dis-
carding the ministerial exemption.  Two other arguments would have 
expanded the size of the protected private sphere by limiting the reach of 
antidiscrimination laws into the commercial realm, either by exempting 
business owners based on religious objections or excusing all businesses 
other than monopolies from compliance.  The Supreme Court has already 
rejected the first argument, and the second two are likely to face similar 
fates if pressed on constitutional grounds.  Meanwhile, legislatures have not 
been receptive to the argument that they should grant new religious exemp-
tions in the commercial realm as a prudential matter, and cultural forces do 
not appear poised to alter that state of affairs.  While there is still an active 
constituency working on behalf of such exemptions, opponents are working 
just as hard, and continued maintenance of the status quo appears highly 
likely.118 
Of course, the actual maintenance of the status quo with respect to the 
public-private distinction is no guarantee that everyone will perceive the 
line to be stable, especially in a time of great social contestation over issues 
affected by where the line is drawn.  False alarms are already ringing about 
threats to religious liberty and civil rights, and more will surely ring in the 
years ahead, but there is no reason to panic. 
Doric columns are not falling. 
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http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/christian-activists-indiana-law-sought-to-protect-
businesses-that-oppose-gay-marriage/2015/04/03/d6826f9c-d944-11e4-ba28-
f2a685dc7f89_story.html (discussing the backlash that greeted the passage of Indiana’s RFRA and 
describing how Indiana lawmakers quickly passed an amendment to clarify that the law “cannot 
be used by businesses, landlords and others to turn away gay customers”). 
